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Abstract
In recent years, forcibly displaced populations have attracted enormous media
attention as an increasing number of disasters and political conflicts push more and
more people to move away from their homes and seek refuge and opportunities in
other places. At the same time, political nervousness about the financial and
institutional capability of ‘receiving’ locations to adequately respond to the needs of
these large-scale population movements contributes to the shrinking space for
thinking about the rights and needs of people on the move. It is precisely because
of these global trends that the plight of forcibly displaced populations is becoming
more precarious and vulnerable, yet standard social protection provision rarely
attends to the plight of these people. The purpose of this paper is to elaborate the
remit and implications for including a consideration of forcibly displaced populations
(including internally displaced people, refugees and asylum seekers) within social
protection policy and programming. Drawing on a limited number of recent
initiatives, we suggest some ways in which social protection can be ‘opened’ for
these groups.
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Introduction
Over the last 20 years social protection has risen up the development agenda, so much so
that it sits firmly within the global development architecture as a critical pillar to
supporting social and economic development (see Barrientos & Hulme, 2008; Devereux
& Sabates-Wheeler, 2004; Gentilini & Omamo, 2011; Surender & Walker, 2013). The
majority of the literature and work on social protection has focused on the protection
and provision of social assistance, social insurance and social services to vulnerable and
poor populations in the global south. These populations are typically citizens or habitual
residents of specific nation states, resulting in the majority of policy and programming
efforts being developed by national Governments, or by national Governments in
collaboration with support from international development support. A notable and
increasing (yet relatively small) exception to this has been research that documents and
interrogates the relationship between labour migration and social protection. This
literature has been critical to shifting the framing of social protection away from the
constraints imposed by the nation state – instead allowing a discourse to emerge
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regarding how people are able to claim social rights beyond borders. Work in this area
has expanded in the areas of: (i) portability of social rights (such as pensions and
healthcare) across borders and within economic trading zones protection (Avato, Koettl,
& Sabates-Wheeler, 2010; Olivier, 2009); (ii) inequities in access to social rights for differ-
ent categories of labour migrants (Sabates-Wheeler & Feldman, 2011); (iii) labour market
regulations that cover migrants provision to social protection; and, (iv) the structures of
informal and transnational social protection and care systems for low-income migrants,
particularly those that might move undocumented, or into the informal labour market of
a destination country (Boccagni, 2011).1
Attention to forcibly displaced populations within the social protection field has been
limited. That which is available is typically informed by research from the global North
(see Ambrosini, 2017, 2018 and Sainsbury, 2012). This limit in focus is understandable
due to the difficulties of establishing where the responsibility for provision of social
rights lie -- especially in the case of refugees who are outside their country of residency.
The political economy of provision for refugees and many IDP groups can be extremely
complex, especially if the ruling party or State intentionally decides not to recognise
the rights of the forcibly displaced groups. Furthermore, locating and providing for
people on the move can be logistically very complicated. Yet, despite these challenges,
the current global heightened concerns about large movements of displaced
populations (whether due to political conflict or climate effects) means that there is
imperative to consider how these groups can claim their social rights.
The purpose of this paper is to elaborate the remit for including a consideration of
forcibly displaced populations (including internally displaced people (IDP), refugees
and asylum seekers) within social protection provision. This will involve laying out the
specific disadvantages and vulnerabilities that forcibly displaced populations face, with
attention given to the gendered vulnerabilities of displacement. Our purpose in doing
this is to draw out the implications of displacement for access to and design of social
protection policies, programmes and systems. While still a limited field of research, we
hope to understand better the opportunities currently available for adapting and
building social protection responses to serve the needs of the forcibly displaced.
The rest of this paper comprises the following sections. First, we define and describe
the specific groups and populations of interest in this paper, laying out the vulnerabil-
ities and associated needs for social protection that these groups have by nature of their
displacement. We then describe the legal rights ascribed to specific sub-groups of
displaced populations. The third section highlights the opportunities currently afforded
by international global commitments as well as innovations in social protection to cater
for displaced populations within the design and delivery of social protection. The paper
concludes by offering suggestions for how social protection can cater for forcibly
displaced populations and identifies areas where further work is needed.
Differentiating forcibly displaced populations
There are a number of terms used to describe different groups of forcibly displaced
people, some of which have specific legal force and others of which are intended to
1Interesting research in this area provides rich analysis on transnational social protection in the context of
gendered care work and care responsibilities.
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underline specific vulnerabilities. These include those mapped as part of Table 1, below.
In this paper we focus on forcibly displaced populations, specifically refugees, asylum
seekers and IDPs.2 Returnees are included in the table below as they frequently
constitute just another phase in the movement of displaced groups. The drivers and
experience of movement are different for the various groups. For instance, refugees are
recognized as such based on the grounds of movement due to persecution. This
movement can be mass movements of large numbers or individual and family
movement, where journeys are frequently clandestine and rely upon smuggling
networks. Whereas, returnee movements in response to improved security and peace at
the home location might be in the form of ‘spontaneous return’ or as organized mass
repatriation (sometimes involuntarily) with international assistance (we do not consider
the situations of returnees in depth). Moreover, the notion of mixed migration suggests
that people may start out as forced migrants (e.g. persecution) but then continue as
labour migrants once they leave the place of first refuge to move on for economic
opportunities.
Forced displacement, vulnerability and the need for social protection
There are an estimated 244 million people currently living in a country other than that
of their birth.3 This includes 21.3 million refugees who have fled war and persecution,
as well as other populations that have been displaced as a result of insecurity, natural
disaster or the effects of climate change. In addition to this there are an estimated 38
million IDPs who have been forced to leave their homes.4 The magnitude of vulnerabil-
ity for these groups is obvious, simply by virtue of the large and increasing numbers as
well as the high levels of insecurity that these populations often face, such as the
absence of family and community networks, and the inability to reach and/or settle in
safe areas.
Social protection in all its forms (state-provided, market, informal) is, fundamentally,
a policy response to vulnerability (see Barrientos & Hulme, 2008; Sabates-Wheeler &
Devereux, 2008). As discussed in the introduction to this special issue, social protection
describes all public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers
to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and enhance the social
status and rights of the marginalised (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004). Social pro-
tection interventions – or the lack of them – can play a part in terms of precipitating,
directing or halting movement (e.g. from a country of origin without a functioning
social protection system).
Forcibly displaced populations face a range of vulnerabilities, some specific to their
reasons for moving and some specific to their legal status. Other vulnerabilities are not
displacement-specific, but related to the places and sectors in which people find them-
selves. For instance, refugees hosted within the destination population (as opposed to a
camp) may find themselves exposed to risks associated with precarious low-wage
2We do not consider migrants who move predominantly to seek employment as the issues facing these
populations can be substantially different. For a review of the social protection needs and opportunities for
labour migrants see Avato et al. (2010).
3UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), International Migration Report 2015: Highlights.
ST/ESA/SER.A/375, 2016, p.1.
4Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Figures, http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-
figures
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Table 1 Definitions of different groups of forcibly displaced populations and reasons for
movement
Group Definition Drivers of Movement
Refugees The 1951 Convention on the Status of
Refugees, defines refugees as those
individuals who ‘owing to well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, [are] out-
side the country of his nationality and [are]
unable or, owing to such fear, [are] unwill-
ing to avail himself of the protection of that
country’a
Primary:
• Persecution
• Events seriously disturbing public order
• Generalized violence
• Massive human rights violations
• Conflict
• Lack of state protection
• Movement is gender and age-biased de-
pending on culture and context
Secondary (especially important in
choosing destination):
• Poverty/Opportunity
• Diaspora/family connections
Second and third generation refugees may
never have engaged in migration, but
have been born into exile.
In Africa, the 1969 OAU Convention further
included those fleeing ‘events seriously
disturbing the public order’b
The 1984 Cartagena Declaration similarly
expanded the definition to cover those
fleeing ‘generalized violence, foreign
aggression, internal conflicts, massive
violation of human rights or other
circumstances which have seriously
disturbed public order’ in Latin America,
Mexico and Panamac
Palestinian refugees are defined by the
United Nations’ Relief and Work Agency
(UNRWA) as those ‘whose normal place of
residence was Palestine during the period 1
June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost
both home and means of livelihood as a
result of the 1948 conflict’, as well as their
patrilineal descendantsd
In cases of mass influx due to conflict or
violence, it is not always possible or
necessary to conduct individual interviews
to determine an asylum claim. Depending
on the legal system in place, refugees’
claims may instead be recognized on a
prima facie basis due to ‘readily apparent’
circumstances in the country of origin (e.g.
Syrians, Somalis).
Asylum Seekers An individual who has made a claim for
refugee status, but whose individual claim
has not yet been subject to determination,
either by national authorities or by UNHCR
As refugees
Internally Displaced
Persons
IDPs are those who have been forced to
flee their home, ‘in particular as a result of
or in order to avoid the effects of armed
conflict, situations of generalized violence,
violations of human rights or natural or
human-made disasters, and who have not
crossed an internationally recognized
border’e
Primary:
• Persecution
• Conflict
• Generalized violence
• Human rights violations
• Natural or man-made disasters (e.g. earth-
quake, famine)
• Climate change
Secondary:
• Poverty/Opportunity
• Language/Ethnic connections
Returnees Returnees include refugees voluntarily
repatriating at the end of conflict, as part of
a “durable solution” to their displacement.
Equally, failed asylum seekers and other
migrants moving or staying irregularly may
be subject to enforced removals and/or
offered assistance to return and reintegrate
voluntarily to their country of origin (AVRR).
Primary (refugees):
• Improved security/peace
• Improved development prospects
• Family reunification
Primary (other migrants):
• Legal deportation
• AVRR programme
• Care responsibilities and family
reunification
Other forcibly People may also be forced to cross a border Primary:
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employment. Vulnerabilities may also be influenced by an individual or group’s charac-
teristics (e.g. gender or age) and may change over time and through different stages of
a migration journey. For instance, social protection may protect women in transit from
specific sorts of harm that they may encounter along the journey. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that women on the San Diego- Mexican border pay larger fees to smugglers
than men because they prefer to cross at official points with false documents in order
to avoid sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) at the hands of the coyotes.5 The
needs of migrants and displaced populations are diverse and reflect the contexts (envir-
onmental, cultural and political) to which they move or settle into.
Table 2, below, illustrates the categories of disadvantage and the different
determinants of vulnerabilities faced forcibly displaced persons. Displacement-specific
disadvantage applies by virtue of having to move or be re-located. For instance, some
refugees are only able to reach a place of safety by relying on smuggling networks,
placing them at risk of exploitation, abuse or harm on a dangerous journey. Women
are often doubly disadvantaged as they are frequently less able to defend themselves
against physical abuse and exploitation. Refugees, especially those living in a camp-
based setting, may experience specific challenges related to access to employment
opportunities. In addition, IDPs frequently face socio-cultural disadvantage through
systematic discrimination and denial of their rights and entitlements as citizens or legal
residents. Displacement-intensified disadvantage occurs when a negative outcome is
intensified for a displaced population. In other words, it is not specific to those being
displaced -- it can be equally real for some groups that are not displaced, such as the
urban poor who are marginalized in terms of rights and live in areas with poor public
and social service provision. For displaced populations, particularly IDPs and refugees,
it is often the case that upon arrival to a new location they are ‘housed’ in areas where
Table 1 Definitions of different groups of forcibly displaced populations and reasons for
movement (Continued)
Group Definition Drivers of Movement
displaced (including
climate change)
for reasons other than conflict or
persecution, for instance as a result of
natural disaster or climate change.
Depending on where they are, such
persons often do not qualify for refugee
status, but they be granted humanitarian
leave or some other form of temporary
protection (e.g. the US’ “Temporary
Protected Status”)f
• Natural or man-made disasters (e.g. earth-
quake, famine)
• Climate change
• Insecurity
Secondary:
• Poverty/Opportunity
• Diaspora/family connections
aUN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189,
p. 137. Retrieved from http://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html
bOrganization of African Unity (OAU), Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (“OAU
Convention”), 10 September 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45. Retrieved from http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36018.html
cRegional Refugee Instruments & Related, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection of
Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, 22 November 1984. Retrieved
from http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36ec.html
dUnited Nations Relief and Works Agency, Palestinian Refugees. Retrieved from http://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees
eUN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted
pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39. Addendum: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 11 February 1998, E/
CN.4/1998/53/Add.2. Retrieved from http://www.refworld.org/docid/3d4f95e11.html, Art. 2
fUnited States Citizen and Immigration Service, Temporary Protected Status. Retrieved
from https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status
5Fleury, A.,https://unu.edu/publications/articles/fleeing-to-mexico-for-safety-the-perilous-journey-for-
migrant-women.html
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poorer residents are located and are therefore exposed to the same disadvantages as the
sedentary population, such as lack of access to the formal labour market, payment
below minimum wage, and lack of access to health and education services. Hagen-
Zanker, Ulrichs, Holmes, and Nimeh (2017), in their work looking at Syrian refuges in
Jordan, illustrate the range of vulnerabilities facing refugees in relation to housing and
education access. In such cases, due to the irregular nature of their status, they cannot
easily appeal for formal protection.
Bureaucratically imposed disadvantage refers to officials’ attitudes and ideas that
exacerbate customary discrimination. For instance, asylum processing can be very
lengthy, bureaucratic and opaque, leaving refugees unable to fully enjoy the rights
guaranteed to them under international law. Based on a case study of the Kakuma
refugee camp in north Kenya, Bartolomei, Pittaway, and Pittaway (2003) show how the
loss and denial of citizenship experienced by refugee women, as one of the intersecting
forms of oppression and discrimination, determines their identity. Internal moves can
also be hindered by bureaucratic hurdles. In India, access to the public distribution
system (PDS) (food allowances), is defined by residency status within State boundaries.
Access to the PDS is only available if a move is registered -- which involves a lengthy
bureaucratic process (MacAuslan, 2011). In China, the Hukou (household registration
system) means that social protection rights and access are determined by rural or urban
residency designation, and this cannot be easily altered (Pong, 2014). Forcibly displaced
people suffer over-representation disadvantage when they constitute a disproportion-
ate share of an excluded or marginalized group. This can happen when displaced
people are ghettoized into specific locations, ie, in urban slums. There are multiple
health and safety risks associated with these areas that refugees and IDPs are
particularly vulnerable to, simply because they are overrepresented in these areas.
Table 2 Categories of refugee and other forcibly displaced persons’ disadvantages
Determinant
of
vulnerability
Examples of manifestations
Displacement-
specific
Intensified Bureaucratically
imposed
Over-representation
Spatial /
environmental
Restrictions on
movement (e.g.
encampment).
Unfamiliarity with
surroundings
(unsure about
rights and access).
Increase in
gender-based
violence
Family Split
Lack of knowledge (of
e.g. rights, opportunities
for transport)
Double intensity for
women and dependents
Use of local languages
(can’t understand access
rules)
Health risks
associated with
informal settlements
(difficult to spend time
accessing).
Socio-political Lack of
representation
(ineligible to
access, camps run
without
representation)
Uncertainty interacting
with govt/agencies
(opaque institutional
complaints mechanisms)
Discrimination in access
to services; (ineligible to
access).
Gender-bias in
legislation
Restrictions on
political activities in
camp esp. for women
and youth (inability to
express voice).
Socio-cultural Xenophobia
(discrimination in
access)
Social discrimination
based on ethnicity,
language, illegal status,
gender and age
(discrimination in
provision).
Additional stigmatising
requirements to access
services (required to
show additional eligibility
documents)
Social perceptions of
‘criminal poor’
(additional scrutiny of
access documents)
Source: Adapted from Sabates-Wheeler and Waite (2003, p. 13)
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Pittaway and Rees (2006) explain how specific and compounding risks related to being
in camps or fleeing from home cumulate, lead to multiple jeopardy for refugee women,
who are more vulnerable to domestic violence.
Gender, displacement and vulnerability
Decisions (forced or voluntary) to move frequently take place within the portfolio of
options on offer to an entire family/household. These decisions are gendered, signifi-
cantly impacting familial and gendered patterns of care. Kofman and Raghuram (2010)
show how transnational families between less developed and more developed countries
are increasingly interconnected by way of ‘care regimes’ and ‘global care chains’.
Similarly, Bilecen and Barglowski (2015) discuss how transnational living is of strategic
important for understanding the fragmented worlds of social protection. Depending on
the context of movement (whether movement happens in response to perceived
opportunities or due to displacement) families are often split across geographic space
along lines of gender and age. Adult men and male youth frequently have more
opportunities to move away from disasters or in response to job opportunities, leaving
older persons, spouses and young children at home. This can exacerbate the vulnerabil-
ities of those left at home in relation to regular income, control of land and access to
credit.
In the case of refugees, more than 50% of the world’s refugees are women and girls
(UNWomen, 2016).6 Violence against women is rampant during armed conflict. As
reported by Pittaway and Bartolomei (2018), found that rape and other forms of sexual
torture are used routinely as strategies of war in order to shame and demoralize
individuals, families, and communities. Furthermore, resettlement policies have
historically been key in discriminating against women on grounds of both race and gen-
der. These facts provide ample justification for why social protection for displaced pop-
ulations needs to be sensitive to gender. There are afew recent exceptions where
refugee women and children are given priority treatment, such as in the UK’s Vulner-
able Persons Resettlement (VPR) programme that provides a route for up to 20,000
Syrian refugees to be resettled in the UK. The programme prioritizes refugees who
cannot be supported effectively in the Syrian region, including women and children at
risk, the elderly, those in severe need of medical care, victims of torture and sexual
violence, and the disabled.7 In the last 5 years Canada, also, has made changes in its
refugee policy by prioritizing Syrian women and children for refugee status.
Social protection provision and displacement
Given the different vulnerabilities that displaced populations face, there will be a range of
different social protection responses to these. Social protection can be broadly mapped
over three categories – social assistance to the extremely poor (e.g. cash or food support
through transfers, food aid, school feeding); social insurance which provides resilience
against livelihood shocks and the risk of becoming poor(er) (e.g. informal savings groups,
contributory unemployment or maternity benefits); and complementary initiatives to
6http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/women-refugees-and-migrants
7See Centre for Social Justice paper (Feb 2017): The Syrian Refugee Crisis: a resettlement programme that
meets the needs of the most vulnerable, accessed on 14/06/2018 at: https://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/
core/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/The-Syrian-Refugee-Crisis-Final-002.pdf.
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ensure and improve access to social protection (for instance, through legislation or
through provision of social services that enable conditions of cash transfers to be adhered
to, or through awareness raising campaigns to increase knowledge of rights).8,9 An
example of a complementary initiative would be in the case where an asylum seeker is
unaware of their rights and unable to read the forms necessary to obtain provision. The
initiative would be the provision of information and sensitization to rights as well as the
provision of translation services to overcome language barriers as these will complement
social protection provisioning.
Not all social protection is provided through states and markets, as many of the
articles in this special issue illustrate, but instead it is provided through informal
avenues (relying on community, kin, clan or other forms of reciprocity). This is
especially true in contexts where formal state-based social protection is weak and
family and kinship networks are dense. Often forcibly displaced people are moving
from and to contexts of poor state-provided social protection. Further, even where
formal provision is available, the displaced population may not have rights to the
provision, causing them to depend relatively more on informal networks. In a study on
Polish migrants in Germany, Barglowski, Krzyżowski, and Świątek (2015) show that
informal protection, in particular with regards to care, is regarded as superior to formal
social protection as it enables the maintenance of family belonging, language, and
emotions. While this paper recognises the importance of these forms of social
protection, we are primarily interested in assessing formal social protection policy and
provision.
Formal social protection is normally conceived of as state-led, but in certain contexts
– particularly when considering forced displacement – non-state, internationally-led
social protection is the norm (for instance, provided by the UN or donors). This is
usually because there are significant institutional and democratic deficits in the
majority of contexts where large-scale forced displacement occurs, the institutional and
political contexts are in crisis and national social protection system often do not exist.
Under these types of circumstances the international humanitarian sector plays a
critical role in provision as it operates on principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality
and independence – meaning that it has a non-political mandate for ensuring the
protection and welfare of displaced groups in need.10 An obvious exception to this is
illustrated in recent European movements where states are the primary providers of
social protection (as the systems were already in place). Although, in Greece during the
2015–2016 refugee crisis the UNHCR operated as it would in other zones of major
displacement – in other words, the State was not the primary provider of social
provision due, in part, to the enormity of the challenges.
8See definition and conceptualisation of social protection in the European Development Report, 2010/2011:
Social Protection for Inclusive Development: A new perspective in EU Cooperation with Africa.
9While all definitions of social protection include, at their core, the social assistance element and often the
social insurance element, not all definitions are as broad as the one we are proposing (above) for framing this
paper. However, it is clear that over the past 10 years we have seen the social protection discourse and space
evolving to encompass a strong rights-based element as well as a recognition that standard social protection
instruments can achieve strong positive livelihood and growth outcomes when coordinated with other sec-
toral initiatives. See Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2013) and Sabates-Wheeler, Abdulai, Wilmink, De
Groot, and Spadafora (2017).
10Sphere Handbook, 2011.
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Where national systems do exist for forcibly displaced people, sometimes the
provision and targeting may be so politicized that the population experiencing displace-
ment are precisely those who are actively excluded from provision. Sainsbury (2012)
describes the process of rights contraction for foreigners under the Thatcher and Major
British conservative governments. Political framing of the topic of foreigners’ abuse of
benefits irrespective of entry category under these governments meant that negative
labelling from ‘the top’ sent a message that British benefits were a magnet for attracting
unwanted immigrants. ‘This allowed the political justification for cutbacks to those
eligible for benefits and, as a consequence, benefits were pegged as a lower rate for
asylum seekers setting a precedent in differentiating the benefits of non-citizens and
citizens’ (Sainsbury, 2012, p. 167/8).
Bauböck (2018) provides an illuminating analysis of the complexities and pitfalls of
burden-sharing for refugee protection in the European Union. Despite the fact that ‘the
European Union offers the best conditions that can be assumed under real world
circumstances for an effective regional refugee protection regime’ (Bauböck, 2018, p.
142), the author shows how this potential has not been realised due to institutional
failures to Europeanise refugee policies.
Social protection context as a driver of mobility and displacement
The intersection of social protection and displacement/flight drivers is developed in
Fig. 1 below. The purpose of this figure is to depict, at a general level, the relationships
between inherently multi-sited drivers of displacement. The context at home and what
is known about any potential destination will affect the household and individual
decision to move away from a place of origin to a specific destination, but also the
decision to move from one destination to another, or to return. This will affect
household membership/structure and the vulnerability of some household members –
particularly those left behind if there is no regular income or informal care networks
collapse. The choice is a dynamic one, in the sense that it takes place over multiple
Fig. 1 Displacement, migration and flight drivers: vulnerability and opportunity
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time periods and also across potential sites. Considerations of vulnerability, and of real
and perceived security (both physical and income), will affect this decision, as will the
quality of information available to a would-be migrant regarding potential destinations.
While the factors pushing the forcibly displaced to leave are extreme, often making the
social-political context of a refugee or other forcibly displaced persons’ first destination
less immediately relevant than its geographic proximity, socio-political context (includ-
ing social protection provision and access) will often influence longer-term decision-
making (Bakewell, van Hear, & Long, 2012). The dynamic and multi-sited nature of the
displacement and decision-making implies that movement will affect household
structures, labour market decisions and care-dependency ratios. So, for instance, if an
adult male earner is forced to leave a household comprised of children, elderly and one
female adult, then this will have significant implications for the economic and social
stability and sustainability of the household left at destination.
Much of the public discussion on forced displacement and refugees occurs in a static,
one-directional framing of movement. That is, a refugee is seen as moving from one
country to another and then remaining there until he/she might return or be returned.
Bakewell (2008) is vocal on this in highlighting the ‘sedentary bias’ that shapes state-
centred responses to migration in the context of conflict. But, as illustrated in the
figure above, movement is dynamic and while the first move might have occurred in
the context of conflict and shock, further moves might be in the context of voluntary
migration for economic or social purposes.
A limited number of studies on the influence of different countries welfare and
asylum support systems suggests that they are not important to a person’s initial
decision to migrate. However, the policies and rules of different destination countries
may influence later decisions on whether to continue to another country where
opportunities and conditions may be better (Kuschminder, de Bresser, & Siegel, 2015;
Triandafyllidou, 2009). An increase in onward movement may follow a cut in social
provisioning resulting from a drop in humanitarian or development funding (e.g. re-
duced food assistance) [e.g. Syrian refugees leaving Jordan after food aid cuts; see
Danish Refugee Council, 2016]. In other cases, refugees and other forced migrants may
grow frustrated with receiving basic social assistance as a substitute for other rights
(“care and maintenance”) and engage in onward movements in the hope of securing
(often irregular) access to the labour market, and a greater degree of empowerment
and dignity [e.g. Somali refugees moving from Kenya; see Moret, Baglioni, & Efionayi-
Mader, 2006].
Winder Rossi, Spano, Sabates-Wheeler, and Kohnstamm (2017) develop a
categorization of social protection contexts. Social protection strategies and interven-
tions vary widely according the specific contexts at local level. This framework
summarizes different scenarios which can be used to define the most appropriate social
protection intervention strategy in a given context. The scenarios include levels of
system maturity based on state capacity, as well as flexibility and capacity to respond –
ranging from a case in which the provision of social protection is completely absent, to
a situation in which the social protection system is flexible and able to respond in an
appropriate and efficient manner after a shock.
Refugees frequently move from places with shattered or non-existent social protec-
tion systems to locations with only slightly better provision (for instance, refugees
Sabates-Wheeler Comparative Migration Studies            (2019) 7:38 Page 10 of 18
moving from Burundi to Tanzania, where national social protection systems are
nascent but access for refugees is heavily restricted). In conflicts where the state is an
active party to the conflict and does not control all of its territory, then, even well-
developed social protection systems may only be able to reach part of the population.
There may also be non-conflict contexts where a social protection system is well
developed, but regimes deliberately exclude particular population groups from
assistance. It is precisely because of this that extra-governmental organisations,
development agencies and NGOs have developed a range of social protection
provisions to ease the livelihood transition and adaptation of refugees and other
forcibly displaced people.
An often overlooked aspect of provision of social protection is the complex relation-
ship between the forcibly displaced and host communities.11 In situations of substantial
influxes of refugees, such as in the Kosovar-Albanian crisis of 1999, it is possible that
the refugee population, on average, has more financial liquidity at their disposal than
the host population. That is, the local host population may be very poor. Cash or food
transfers and social support targeted only to the refugee population can further exacer-
bate this economic difference, causing social and economic tension between the two
groups. This can lead to local price hikes and a two-tier market for host and refugee
populations, as well as conflict and unrest. Governments and communities can try to
minimise these tensions through various social cohesion initiatives, and also through
extending provision of social protection to the host community in addition to the refu-
gee community. Recent work by Hagen-Zanker et al. (2017) on the impacts of a cash
transfer for Syrian refugees in Jordan shows that the Jordanian Government has a pol-
icy that requires equitable provision of support to both refugees and host populations.
This is one way of helping to resolve local problems.
Legal rights and social protection for forcibly displaced persons
As discussed, forcibly displaced populations have specific, transnational and evolving
social protection needs, yet they face particular challenges accessing formal social pro-
tection programmes upon arrival in a country of destination. The ‘rights on paper’ and
in policy for displaced populations can at the same time provide protection but also
further entrench vulnerabilities for these groups. We illustrate this below.
In her work on immigrant rights in the context of the welfare states of global North,
Sainsbury (2012) describes how the ‘forms of entry’ determine the specific rights and
restrictions for immigrants’ access to social welfare. For instance, the 1951 UN Conven-
tion lays down the obligation to accord refugees the same treatment as national with
regard to social benefits. On the other hand, asylum seekers have minimal rights to so-
cial provision. In other words, the conditions by which one enters a country leads to a
pattern of stratification in relation to social rights (pp 17).
Refugees’ rights related to social protection, as laid out in the 1951 Convention (see
Table 1), include access to the labour market (Article 17); rights to self-employment
(Article 18); inclusion in any rationing scheme (Article 20); access to housing (Article
11Refugees rarely enjoy de jure the same level of social protection as national citizens. Furthermore in
practice, there are situations where the level of refugee assistance – even if partial and imperfect - is superior
to what local citizens de facto receive from their governments in the social protection arena (usually in
LDCs).
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21); right to public elementary education (Article 22); right to public relief (Article 23);
and social security and employment legislation (Article 24). In some cases (rationing,
elementary education), rights are equivalent to those of nationals; in most other cases,
refugees are to be provided with ‘the most favourable treatment as possible’, and in any
event ‘not less favourable than any other migrant’. However, many states have lodged
reservations against the obligations laid out in the 1951 Convention (especially Articles
17, 23 and 24).
Other States (particularly those in the Middle East, such as Lebanon) do not fully
recognize these obligations in practice, even where a reservation is not in place. Refu-
gees may often face heavy restrictions in terms of accessing local labour markets,
especially when required to live in designated areas (e.g.“encampment”). Provision of
basic social protection (food aid, cash assistance) often falls to humanitarian agencies
whose funding for such programmes may be short-term. Where social protection is
inadequate in a first country of asylum, this may contribute to onward movement of
refugees.
Refugee advocates argue that once recognized on a prima facie basis as a refugee, an
individual should be able to presumptively enjoy all the rights, including to social
protection, granted under the 1951 Convention. However, in practice states may limit
prima facie refugees’ access to these rights, for instance by restricting access their
access to labour markets and insisting upon refugees’ encampment. Furthermore,
Pittaway and Bartolomei (2001) point out that the gender blindness of the Refugee
Convention and international law and domestic policy relating to refugee women has
been recognized only relatively recently within the international system. The Refugee
Convention does not recognize persecution based on grounds of gender as a claim for
refugee status, nor is it clear that violence on grounds of gender can be considered as
persecution. This gender bias is often exacerbated further by humanitarian organisa-
tions working on the ground (for instance, see Grabska, 2011, for a study of gender
mainstreaming in Kakuma refugee camp, Kenya).
Asylum-seeker status should be short-term and temporary. Asylum-seekers have the
right not to be returned to their country of origin until their claim for refugee status is
adjudicated, but any social protection rights are dependent upon national laws. In prac-
tice, asylum-seekers can wait several months or years for their claims to be heard, and
asylum-seekers’ rights to work or access social protection are often heavily restricted.
While many OECD/industrialized states offer asylum-seekers limited state support
(housing, basic income support), levels of social assistance are often inadequate, and in
these and many other settings asylum-seekers must often rely upon NGO and charit-
able assistance. This may contribute to onward movement of asylum-seekers away from
states with slow asylum processing systems and limited rights for those waiting for a
determination.
Internally Displaced Persons are very often citizens of the country in which they are
resident and in other cases are for the most part habitual residents, many with similar
rights to nationals. The cornerstone of IDP protection is non-discrimination, i.e. equal
recognition of IDPs’ rights without regard to their displacement. This includes their
rights to social protection, which should be recognized as equivalent to those other citi-
zens or habitual residents. However, as a result of their forced displacement, IDPs may
face specific challenges in realizing their rights, especially if a state is actively hostile to
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the IDP group (e.g. ethnic discrimination) or where conflict or natural disaster has
destroyed infrastructure and weakened state capacity. In such cases, the ability of IDPs
to secure basic social protection – food, housing, healthcare – may depend upon inter-
national organisations’ programmes, and their access to the labour market may be
limited. A failure to provide adequate social protection to IDPs may contribute to their
onward movement and secondary displacement, either within the country or beyond its
borders (so that IDPs become refugees). Even where resettlement is an option, Pittaway
and Bartolomei (2001) show that resettlement policies actively discriminate against
women on grounds of both race and gender.12
Constraints and opportunities: designing social protection systems that can
accommodate forcibly displaced populations
In recent years, refugees and forcibly displaced populations have attracted enormous
media attention as an increasing number of disasters and political conflicts push more
and more people to move away from their homes and seek refuge and opportunities in
other places. The rise of the political right in a number of western nations, together
with nervousness about the financial and institutional capability of ‘receiving’ locations
to adequately respond to the needs of these large-scale population movements, means
that the space for thinking about the rights and needs of people on the move has
become limited and increasingly political. Nonetheless, it is precisely because of these
global trends that the plight of forcibly displaced populations (including refugees) is
becoming more precarious and vulnerable.
Counteracting these constraints are the global commitments to the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) and a ‘leave no one behind’ agenda, social protection for all
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Global Social Protection
Floor initiative, and most recently the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
(CRRF) – adopted in 2016 by all 193 member states. With regard to forced
displacement, in particular, there has been no time as pressing as the current to think
innovatively about universal workable solutions for people on the move. The SDGs take
us some way towards this, but there is obvious space for innovations in social
protection implementation and delivery for people on the move, for non-citizen
populations, for refugees and the forcibly displaced.
The international policy context, together with increasing migrant flows, has created
an appetite for ensuring that human rights are available to all forcibly displaced popula-
tions. Protecting these groups against insecurity and deprivation requires commitment
at both political and practical levels. In states where there are well-developed social
protections for citizens (such as the UK), the inclusion of refugees and other forcibly
displaced people in these systems is generally preferable to the development of parallel
programmes delivered by international or national humanitarian. However, there may
be resistance to state-led provision and/or specific circumstances (e.g. rural and isolated
refugee camps with no close local population; a weak host state; a hostile state) where
it is more appropriate or realistic for social protection to be delivered and financed by
non-state actors. This can introduce challenges related to financial sustainability and
12For other forcibly displaced people granted some form of temporary protection, their access to social
assistance and social services is dependent upon national law.
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the duration of provision, undermining any entitlement/rights intention of the
provision, as well as raising questions about accountability. Such issues underline the
importance of efforts to move from fragmented short-term humanitarian funding to
more predictable long-term models which have some of the characteristics of a state
led system (e.g. common targeting, registration, financing etc.), although led by inter-
national actors. This can be complicated, as even when well-developed social protection
systems for citizens are in existence many states hosting forcibly displaced people may
be unable to afford – financially or politically – to include these groups without inter-
national financial assistance.
Despite this, opportunities are emerging from within the evolving field of shock-
responsive social protection that encourages us to innovate for the inclusion of
displaced populations. What was once a deeply held belief that the needs of the
displaced could only be met through humanitarian assistance, is now being challenged
as the international community seeks to trial ways to harmonise humanitarian response
within social protection systems – through targeting, beneficiary registration, payment
and delivery.
A recent new focus on shock-responsive social protection means that donor and
development agencies are supporting Governments to build national programmes that
are able to scale up and down according to seasonal needs and in response to shocks
(O’Brien, Cherrier, Watson, & Congrave, 2017). Social protection programmes are
increasingly being designed with specific mechanisms that enhance their flexibility to
respond in the event of crises, including, contingency funds, price indexing to respond
to seasonal or unexpected variability, expanded management and information systems
(MIS), as well as pre-determined plans to be able to scale up (eg: expansion in number
of beneficiaries and/or increase in size of transfer). This is an important area of
programming where migrants and refugee’s needs can potentially be catered for within
planning and projections of caseloads. Two examples of this kind of programming are
the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia and the Hunger Safety Net
Programme (HSNP) in Kenya.
While the contingency funds and risk financing facility has been used in Ethiopia
quite successfully in recent years, and the HSNP flexible response function has been
praised for its ability to quickly scale up and out, whether forcibly displaced people
have benefitted from these systems, en masse, is unlikely and has not yet been evalu-
ated. The discretion for local level administrators to apply the contingency funds means
that some categories of vulnerable migrants and displaced people might be fortunate
enough to access transfers in times of crisis. However, neither the PSNP nor the HNSP
are set up to respond to large numbers of people on the move, as in the case of refu-
gees on IDP movements. This is because the programmes are targeted to citizens
(through ID requirements in targeting) and the funds available for contingency would
not be able to support huge numbers of additional claimants. For this reason, large-
scale movements are dealt with through the humanitarian sector, in conjunction with
the international community.
Even in those rare cases where displaced individuals or households may be able to
benefit from the horizontal expansion in the system, in practice expansion to mobile
households is very complicated. Simply by being mobile, it may be too difficult and
costly to locate the household and deliver the transfer. The increasing use of mobile
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and digital technology means that there is ample space to innovate in this area. For in-
stance, cash transfers delivered through e-payments means that beneficiaries are not
tied to a place of payment.
Regardless of circumstance, states are rarely the only providers of social protection. It
is important to note the role played by informal social protection – remittances, for
instance, are often an essential component of social protection for many refugee and
displaced families.13 We might consider the balance of provision not just between the
state, market and family, but also the social networks and parallel systems of provision,
which both serve migrants and displaced populations, but also reinforce their exclu-
sions for the mainstream (Prasad-Aleyamma, 2011).
In a similar vein, recent research by Easton-Calabria and Pincoc (2018) in Uganda and
Kenya ‘reveals the ways in which refugees are working to support, protect, advocate for
and transform the prospects of their communities’ (pp. 56). They term this ‘refugee-led
social protection’, which ‘includes activities to address vulnerability, such as providing
food, shelter, education and health care, but also involves advocacy and the resulting
transformation of local and international structures, such as laws and humanitarian sys-
tems, which may hinder rather than enable refugees’ access to such provisions’ (pp. 56).
From the point of view of disadvantaged groups, such as, women, ethnic minorities,
the elderly and migrants, the organization of social protection and welfare is crucial in
shaping both their eligibility and address to decommodified benefits, and also in defin-
ing and reinforcing their subordinate statuses (Orloff, 1993; Rosenhek, 1999).
Furthermore, international actors and states can work to help strengthen informal
forms of social protection, for instance by working to reduce remittance costs. This is im-
portant because the current global political climate – in particular, widespread popular
anxieties about the arrival of refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants in local communities
– has reduced these groups’ access to state-based social protection, both by narrowing op-
portunities for legal mobility and by limiting access to social protection upon arrival.
Conclusions
As a policy instrument for dealing with vulnerability, access to social protection
provision is particularly pertinent for those people and populations who are made
vulnerable due to persecution, conflict and displacement. Gender further exacerbates
the vulnerability to poverty, rights abuse and exploitation that are frequently associated
with displacement. Furthermore, family structure and lifecycle mediates how
vulnerability through the care economy plays out when one or more family member is
‘displaced.’ Forced displacement frequently leads to vulnerabilities that require specific
social protection instruments. This is pertinent for women, children and older migrants
who are, frequently by nature of their age and gender, left behind in highly vulnerable
and dependent situations, or are unwilling/unable to take the risks required to move
again. Compounding this disadvantage, the vast majority of refugees and other forcibly
displaced people are hosted in states where social protection coverage is often severely
limited even for citizens.14
13There is a vast literature on the role of remittances in social provisioning for refugees and migrants. We do
not cover this here.
1486% of refugees, for instance, are hosted in the developing world. UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced
Displacement in 2015, June 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.pdf, p.2.
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Standard social protection frameworks, in the main, do not attend to the plight of ref-
ugees and forcibly displaced people and their relation to welfare. This is largely because
these framings do not incorporate institutional, social and political challenges to wel-
fare provision, which are characteristics of displacement-specific vulnerability. Despite
increased global recognition of the role that formal social protection can play in
reducing vulnerabilities and building resilience and national and international political
commitment to expanding formal social protection, significant gaps and barriers to
access remain. This is especially true for refugees, asylum seekers and other forcibly
displaced populations who frequently find themselves in territories or places where
their rights to formal social protection are heavily restricted, or where access barriers
are so high that they are unable to take advantage of provision even where it is available
(Ambrosini, 2018; Sainsbury, 2012). Critically, for populations on the margins, such as
children, women and older people, policies covering forcibly displaced persons rights,
including policies on refugees, resettlement, repatriation and integration need to be
recast and applied in a way that pro-actively addresses gendered and generational vul-
nerabilities and needs.
The SDGs, the CRRF, and recent interest in integrating social protection and
humanitarian response to crisis through scalable safety-nets, give us a real opportunity
to think about how to best serve the social protection needs of forcibly displaced popu-
lations. There are a number of opportunities for social protection programming to be
tailored to help reduce the vulnerabilities of these groups, prior to departure, during
the journey, upon arrival in a country of destination, and at the point of return. These
include piggy backing extra-state provision for refugees onto established state systems
of the social provision for refugees, such as in the case of Syrian refugees in Jordan. It
could also include the use of e-payment linked to cash transfers. Social protection
mechanisms in the form of social transfers (cash, food, vouchers or assets), social wel-
fare services or occupation-linked insurance will be appropriate to different situations
at different times, and may be provided by a range of actors (State, market, donors,
CBOs, NGOs and relatives). New work on social protection contexts help us to identify
the best-placed actors to deliver social protection for displaced populations in each
context. Furthermore, the move to harmonize humanitarian and social protection in-
struments and systems will open up space to offer more reliable social protection for
these vulnerable groups. For instance, efforts to align targeting and monitoring systems
between the humanitarian and social sectors will ensure that the acutely poor and vul-
nerable (such as, refugees and IDPs affected by conflict or natural fast onset shocks)
are retained within a system of possible beneficiaries and are more likely to benefit
from long term support as development actors take over from where humanitarians
leave off.
In addition, more empirical research – including real-time evaluation of the impact
of social protection interventions – is needed in order to better use social protection to
meet forcibly displaced peoples’ needs and vulnerabilities, and to better understand the
role social protection plays in shaping peoples’ decisions to move. Inclusive innovations
in social protection for the forcibly displaced will include complementary interventions
that promote social integration, the removal of information bottlenecks, sensitivity to
language and culture in the design of social protection instruments and advances in
digital payment delivery and targeting.
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